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Abstract
This paper examines the role of scal policy in the long run. We show
that (i) dynamic ine¢ ciency may be empirically relevant in a modied
Diamond OLG model with imperfect competition, (ii) scal policy may
be needed to avoid ine¢ ciency (if investment adjusts passively to saving)
and maintain full employment (if investment and saving decisions are
taken separately), (iii) a simple and distributionally neutral tax scheme
can maintain full employment in the face of variations in household con-
dence, and (iv) the debt ratio is inversely related to both the growth
rate and government consumption.
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1 Introduction
Diamond (1965) provides a classic analysis of the usefulness of public debt in
dynamically ine¢ cient economies. This well-known result gains real-world sig-
nicance insofar as actual economies become dynamically ine¢ cient in the ab-
sence of public debt. The general consensus seems to be that this is not the
case: empirically the rate of return on capital appears to exceed the rate of
growth.
The empirical argument has two potential weaknesses. To ascertain the need
for scal policy and public debt one would need to evaluate the rate of return in a
state without public debt; it is not su¢ cient to show that dynamic e¢ ciency may
hold if the evidence applies to an economy with signicant amounts of public
debt. Moreover, the standard e¢ ciency criterion that the rate of return exceed
the growth rate  is based on the identication of the rate of return with the
marginal product of capital. This identication breaks down in our modied
Diamond model with imperfect competition: with a markup on marginal cost,
the rate of return exceeds the marginal product of capital.
In a second modication of the Diamond model, we introduce Keynesian
concerns. Households save but investment decisions are made by rms, and
what appears as a problem of dynamic ine¢ ciency in a neoclassical version of
the model turns into a problem of aggregate demand and unemployment in
the Keynesian setting. We use a Leontief production function in most of the
analysis. This specication brings out the key issues quite sharply. But the
Leontief assumption can be relaxed we do this in section 4 which allows for
factor substitution and the main argument is independent of the specication
of the production function.
The motivation behind our analysis derives from the recent focus on public
debt in policy debates. This focus is peculiar for many reasons. Most obviously,
a recession with high unemployment would seem the wrong time to address
public debt issues, whatever their long-term signicance. From a theoretical
perspective, moreover, the focus is surprising because dominant macroeconomic
models imply that public debt is largely irrelevant. This irrelevance of debt
in benchmark theoretical models may lie behind another curious feature of the
debate: the emphasis on purely empirical studies. The empirical strand is repre-
sented most prominently by Reinhart and Rogo¤s (2009) celebrated analysis of
crisis episodes from eight centuries and a range of economies. In a subsequent
paper, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) suggest that debt-income levels above 90
1
percent tend to be associated with lower rates of economic growth. The impact
of this claim and the atheoretical approach, more generally seems surprising
in a profession which for many years has been guided by the Lucas critique;
the interpretation of statistical correlations would seem quite daunting in this
particular application.
The Reinhart and Rogo¤ claim has been challenged by other studies (e.g.
Irons and Bivens (2010)) but the challenge has been largely empirical. Our
analysis contributes a theoretical perspective on this (and other) policy issues:
we nd a relationship between debt and growth rates a low growth rate gen-
erates a high steady-growth ratio of debt to income but the causal link unam-
biguously runs from growth to debt.
OLG models with imperfect competition have been developed by, among
others, dAspremont et al. (1995), Pagano (1990) and Jacobsen and Schultz
(1994). Like our analysis in this paper, these models examine the potential
usefulness of scal policy. But this similarity masks fundamental di¤erences
in the structure of the models and the nature of the scal e¤ects. Assuming
Cournot competition, dAspremont et al. show that scal policy can be used to
inuence the equilibrium markup which along with an elastic labor supply 
determines equilibrium employment; the model has no capital, no dynamic inef-
ciency, no Keynesian unemployment, and the government balances its budget
in each period. The details are di¤erent in Pagano and Jacobsen and Schultz,
but the scal e¤ects run through changes in competition and market power in
these papers too. By contrast, we take the markup as given, treat the labor
supply as inelastic, and focus on questions of dynamic ine¢ ciency, Keynesian
unemployment, and the dynamics of public debt.
Public debt dynamics have been examined in an OLG setting by Chalk
(2000). Assuming a constant primary decit per worker, he nds that even
if the economy is dynamically ine¢ cient when public debt is zero, a constant
primary decit may be unsustainable. Moreover, in those cases where a primary
decit is sustainable, convergence is to a steady growth path that is dynamically
ine¢ cient. These results invite several questions. Why would a government
want to pursue policies of this kind? Why focus on trajectories that keep a
constant primary decit? Economic analysis of monetary policy typically looks
for optimal policies (or policy rules), given some welfare function and a model
of how the economy operates. Our functional nanceapproach may introduce
market failures that are usually absent in contemporary analysis of monetary
policy but the search for appropriate policies is in a similar spirit. The Keynesian
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literature on functional nancehas a long history, going back to Lerner (1943).1
We know of no other studies, however, that use a formal OLG model to examine
the long run implications of functional nance.
Fiscal policy, we argue, can be used to avoid dynamic ine¢ ciency (when
investment adjust passively to saving) and maintain full employment (when in-
vestment and saving decisions are separate). We rst consider the requirements
in steady growth and then examine the implications of shifts in household con-
dencethat lead to uctuations in saving rates. A simple and distributionally
neutral tax scheme can maintain full employment in the face of these shifts
in condence. Moreover, in the special case where households correctly antici-
pate future taxes, no variations in taxes will be needed: the tax policy e¤ectively
functions as an insurance scheme. Concerns over the sustainability of the public
debt trajectory, nally, nd no support. The required debt is inversely related
to both the growth rate and government consumption, and scal policies based
on functional nance may in some cases lead to high levels of public debt. But
in this OLG setting no scenarios become explosive or otherwise unsustainable.
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the standard OLG model before presenting
our modied version with imperfect competition and Keynesian features. Taxa-
tion and public debt are added in section 3, and we derive the full-employment
requirements for scal policy with special attention to questions of intergener-
ational distribution. Section 4 extends the model by including monetary policy
and a choice of technique. Section 5 discusses implications of the analysis, re-
lating it to recent policy debates. Section 6 presents a few concluding remarks.
2 OLG models
2.1 Perfect competition and neoclassical production func-
tions
Following Diamond (1965) all agents live for two periods: they work in the rst
period and live o¤ their savings in the second.2 The utility function for a young
1Pedersen (1937) articulated a similar principle of functional nance (Olesen (2001)). Re-
cent contributions include Schlicht (2006), Godley and Lavoie (2007), Arestis and Sawyer
(2010), Kregel (2010), and Ryoo and Skott (2012).
2Expositions of the model can be found in many textbooks, see e.g. Romer (2012, chapter
2).
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agent in period t takes the standard CIES form
U =
c1 1;t   1
1   +
1
1 + 
c1 2;t+1   1
1   ;   0 (1)
where c1;t and c2;t+1 are the levels of consumption per capita when the agent
is young and old,  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
and  is the discount rate. There is full employment and we take the labor
supply to be inelastic.3 Normalizing the supply of an individual worker to one,
the budget constraint is given by
c1;t +
1
1 + rt+1
c2;t+1 = wt (2)
where rt+1 is the rate of return on savings and wt is the real wage.
The maximization problem implies that
c1;t = (1  st)wt (3)
where the young generations saving rate s can be written
st = s(rt+1) =
(1 + rt+1)
(1 )=
(1 + )1= + (1 + rt+1)(1 )=
(4)
Thus, total saving by the young (=the capital stock in the following period) is
given by
Kt+1 = St = stLtwt (5)
where Lt is the number of (young) workers at time t. We assume that Lt grows
at the constant rate n  0;
Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt (6)
.
Using a CES production function without technical change, we have
Yt = [K

t + (1  )Lt ]1= (7)
3Lopez-Garcia (2008) provides an extension with an endogenous labor supply.
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Assuming perfect competition,
wt = (1  )



Kt
Lt

+ (1  )
(1 )=
(8)
rt+1 +  = 

+ (1  )

Lt+1
Kt+1
(1 )=
(9)
where  is the rate of depreciation.
Substituting (4), (8) and (9) into (5) and dividing through by Lt+1; the
dynamics of kt = Kt=Lt can be written
kt+1 =
f1 + [+ (1  )k t+1](1 )=   g(1 )=
(1 + )1= + f1 + [+ (1  )kt+1  ](1 )=   g(1 )=
 (1  )[kt
 + (1  )](1 )=
1 + n
(10)
In general this equation may have multiple steady-growth solutions with kt+1 =
kt; and (one or more of) the solutions may be dynamically ine¢ cient.
2.1.1 Example: Cobb-Douglas production and logarithmic utility
Consider the case where  ! 1 (logarithmic utility) and  ! 0 (Cobb-Douglas
production function). In this case,
Yt = K

t L
1 
t ; 0 <  < 1 (11)
wt = (1  )Kt L t = (1  )kt (12)
and
st =
1
2 + 
(13)
Substituting (12) and (13) in (5) and dividing through by Lt+1; we get
kt+1 =
(1  )
(2 + )(1 + n)
kt (14)
This equation has a unique stationary solution
k =

1  
(2 + )(1 + n)
1=(1 )
(15)
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and the (gross) marginal product of capital at kt = k is given by
r +  = 
(2 + )(1 + n)
1   (16)
The steady growth path is stable but, depending on the values of the parameters
 and , it may or may not be dynamically e¢ cient (may or may not satisfy
the condition r > n).
2.1.2 Example: Leontief production and logarithmic utility
If  !  1, the production function converges to the Leontief form,4
Yt = minfKt; Ltg (17)
In order for full-employment growth to be technically feasible, the capital stock
must grow at least as fast as the labor force when all output is being invested.
Algebraically,
Kt  Yt  (n+ )Kt (18)
or
  n+  (19)
This technical feasibility condition is not su¢ cient, however. With a logarithmic
utility function and a saving rate of 1=(2+) out of wage income, the parameters
need to satisfy the more restrictive condition
stYt =
Yt
2 + 
 Kt+1 = (1 + n)Kt  1 + n

Yt (20)
or
  (1 + n)(2 + ) (21)
We assume that this condition is met.
Turning to the determination of factor prices, perfect competition implies
4The general xed coe¢ cients form
Yt = minfKt; Ltg
is the limiting case of the CES function
Yt = [(Kt)
 + (1  )(Lt) ]1=
In equation (7) we assumed  =  = 1:
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that
wt =
0 if Lt > Kt
 if Lt < Kt
(22)
rt +  =
 if Lt > Kt
0 if Lt < Kt
(23)
The economy has two (non-trivial) steady growth paths.5 There is a full-
utilization path with Kt = Lt and6
w = (2 + )(1 + n)


<  (24)
r +  =    (2 + )(1 + n) > 0 (25)
The steady growth path described by equations (24)-(25) is dynamically e¢ -
cient: it follows from (19) and (23) that any reduction in the capital-labor ratio
would produce a return to capital that exceeds the growth in the labor force
(   > n). The path is also unstable, however: a negative shock to wt reduces
St and implies that Kt=Lt < = in the next period; as a result, wt drops to 0,
there is no saving, and the capital stock drops to 0:
In addition to the e¢ cient steady growth path and the trivial path with
Kt = 0, there is a locally stable steady growth path with less than full utilization
of capital. Starting from the e¢ cient path, a positive shock to w raises saving
and capital intensity increases in the next period to give Kt=Lt > =. The
wage rate then rises to wt =  in subsequent periods, and the economy will be
following a steady growth path with excess capacity:
k =

(2 + )(1 + n)
>


(26)
This steady-growth path clearly is dynamically ine¢ cient; the net return on
capital is negative along this path and we have rt =    n: Consumption
could be increased by reducing investment and eliminating the excess capacity.
2.2 Fixed coe¢ cients and imperfect competition
Empirical arguments against the relevance of dynamic ine¢ ciency have relied on
the identication of the rate of return with the marginal product of capital. This
5 In addition to these two paths there is a trivial steady-growth solution with Kt = Yt = 0:
6The inequalities in (24)-(25) follow from condition (21).
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identication becomes invalid under imperfect competition, and the argument
loses its power.
Consider the Leontief case with logarithmic utility but assume that unlike
in section 2.1 there is imperfect competition. For simplicity assume that the
markup on variable cost is constant and that rms maintain some amount of
excess capital capacity. Thus,
Yt = minfKt; Ltg = Lt < Kt (27)
t =
Yt   wtLt
Yt
=
m
1 +m
=  (28)
where t is the prot share and 1+m is the markup factor. A constant markup
is consistent with prot-maximization if rms perceived demand function is
isoelastic.
Using (5), (27) and (28), and dividing through by Kt; the growth rate of the
capital stock (K^t) is given by
K^t =
Kt+1
Kt
  1 = s(1  ) Yt
Kt
  1 = (1  )ut
2 + 
  1 (29)
where ut = Yt=(Kt)  1 is the utilization rate of capital and a hat over a
variable is used to denote growth rates (x^t = (xt+1   xt)=xt):
The utilization and accumulation rates are constant in steady growth, and
full employment requires that K^t = n. Thus, for given values of ;  and n,
equation (29) determines the steady-growth solution for utilization, u:7 There
is an upper bound on utilization, u  1; and full-employment growth becomes
impossible if there are no solutions satisfying this restriction. The restriction
can be written
 >
1
1   (1 + n)(2 + ) (30)
Unlike in section 2.1, the share of wages is xed at 1   ; this tightens the
feasibility condition, relative to the perfect competition case in equation (21).
Assuming that (30) is met; adjustments in the utilization rate play the same
role as movements along the production function in specications with smooth
substitution; these adjustments allow full employment growth. But the dy-
namic ine¢ ciency problem is brought into stark focus by xed coe¢ cients: for
utilization rates below one, the marginal product of capital is zero, even though
7With xed coe¢ cients and a given prot share, the solution is unique, even if  6= 1: Thus,
the analysis can be extended to cover a general CIES specication of the utility function.
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capital gains a positive rate of return. More generally, having prot rates that
exceed the rate of growth does not imply dynamic e¢ ciency under imperfect
competition.
2.3 Investment and aggregate demand
The presence of excess capacity serves to highlight another issue. So far invest-
ment has been determined passively by household saving, making dynamic ine¢ -
ciency the only downside to high saving. The problem is transformed into one of
aggregate demand if the level of investment is determined by prot-maximizing
rms: some amount of excess capacity may be desired for a variety of reasons,
including entry deterrence (Spence 1977), but prot maximizing rms will not
maintain a constant rate of accumulation if they have persistent, unwanted ex-
cess capacity. Assuming for simplicity that there is a well-dened, constant,
desired rate of utilization, ut = u, a steady growth path must satisfy8
1 + K^ = s(1  )u (31)
s = s(u):9 Equation (31) describes the equilibrium condition for the prod-
uct market along a steady growth path.
Instead of dynamic ine¢ ciency we now have a Harrodian problem of discrep-
ancies between natural and warrantedgrowth rates, K^ R n. A low saving
rate implies that K^ < n and accumulation will be insu¢ cient to keep up with
the growth in the labor force; our feasibility assumption in the previous section
essentially excludes this possibility.10 More interesting for present purposes is
the case of high saving rates and K^ > n. In this situation labor constraints
imply that in the long run output cannot grow at the rate determined by (31).
Excess capacity must emerge and there will be downward pressure on invest-
ment. A reduction in investment, however, cannot restore steady growth at
8 Imperfect competition is critical for the uniqueness of this warranted growth rate, to
use Harrods terminology. As argued in section 2.1, we have ut = u = 1 under perfect
competition; the prot share becomes indeterminate, and equation (8) with K^ = n can be
used to determine t (for ut = u); rather than ut with t = :
9Steady growth paths with a (desired) utilization rate below unity (u < 1) are ine¢ cient,
strictly speaking. Ine¢ ciencies of this kind cannot be addressed using scal policy and are
beyond the scope of the present paper.
10 If u < 1 the condition (30) needs to be strengthened slightly:
u >
1
1   (1 + n)(2 + )
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a lower rate: K^ is uniquely determined by (31). The dynamics depend on
the full specication of investment behavior  not just the steady growth re-
quirement that ut = u  but the likely result is downward instability and
depression.11 Whatever the details, if K^ 6= n, there is no steady growth path
with full employment and equilibrium in the product market.
3 Public debt
Dynamic ine¢ ciency problems can be overcome by introducing a public sector
and public debt. Diamond (1965) analyzed a neoclassical case with smooth
substitution; we focus on the Keynesian case with imperfect competition and a
Leontief production function.
3.1 Adding a public sector
Extending the model, we introduce a government that consumes (Gt), levies
lumpsum taxes on the young and old generations (TYt and T
O
t ) and has debt
(Bt).12 Young households save in the form of xed capital and government
bonds. We assume that these assets are perfect substitutes and have the same
rate of return, rt.
The saving equation (5) now takes the form
Kt+1 +Bt+1 = St (32)
while the public sector budget constraint is given by
Gt + (1 + rt)Bt = Bt+1 + T
Y
t + T
O
t (33)
Returning to a general CIES specication of the utility function, the young
generation in period t maximizes (1) subject to a modied constraint,
c1;t +
1
1 + rt+1
c2;t+1 = wt    t   1 + n
1 + rt+1
t+1 (34)
11A simple Harrodian specication assumes that rms respond to deviations of u from u
by gradually changing their accumulation rate:
K^t+1   K^t = (ut   u); 0 > 0
This specication leads to instability of the warranted path.
12Since the labor supply is taken to be inelastic, it does not matter whether the taxes on
the young are lumpsum or based on wage income.
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where  t  TYt =Lt and t = TOt =Lt. This gives the following solution for saving
St =

st(wt    t) + (1  st) 1 + n
1 + rt+1
t+1

Lt (35)
where st is given by (4). Alternatively, saving can be written
St = ~st(wt    t)Lt (36)
where the young generations saving rate out of the current disposable income
(~st) is given by
~st =
st(wt    t) + (1  st) 1+n1+rt+1 t+1
wt    t (37)
Using (36)-(37) and dividing through by Lt, (32)-(33) can be rewritten;
(1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1) = st(wt    t) + (1  st) 1 + n
1 + rt+1
t+1 (38)
= ~st(wt    t) (39)
gt + (1 + rt)bt = (1 + n)bt+1 +  t + t (40)
where gt  Gt=Lt; bt  Bt=Lt; kt = Kt=Lt.
3.2 Steady growth: the Leontief case with imperfect com-
petition
By denition wt = (1   t) and rt = tut; and steady growth requires that
bt = b; t = ; ut = u
. Substituting these conditions into (38), using (40), and
rearranging, we get
b =
s(1  )  (1 + n)k
1 + n+ s(r   n) +
1
1 + r
   s

1 + n+ s(r   n)g (41)
where r = u and k = 1=(u); and where s = s(r) is determined by
(4).
The required debt (b) depends inversely on public consumption (g) and
directly on the level of taxes on the old generation ().13 For any given , an
increase in g implies that consumption has to contract in order to maintain
13An inverse relation between debt and government consumption is obtained in a non-OLG
setting by Schlicht (2006) and Ryoo and Skott (2012).
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equilibrium in the product market. This is achieved by increasing taxes on the
young. As a result the desired saving decreases and this, in turn, reduces the
need for government debt as an outlet for saving. Analogously, with a given
value of g; an increase in  must be accompanied by a reduction in  in order
to maintain the level of consumption and equilibrium in the goods market; the
disposable income of the young increases, and the amount of public debt must
also increase to meet the rise in saving.
The relation between public debt and economic growth has received attention
recently (e.g. Reinhart and Rogo¤ 2010). It is interesting to note therefore that
the required debt is inversely related to the growth rate n for empirically relevant
values of the parameters; the partial @b=@n is negative if k+(1  s)(b =(1+
r)) > 0. This result is quite intuitive. The reason for the debt is that the
young generation wants to save too much. But the threshold dening too
muchdepends on the growth rate: a higher growth rate implies that more xed
capital will be needed to employ the future generation and, consequently, that
the required amount of public debt will be lower.
Equations (38) and (40) can also be used to derive the steady-growth solution
for the tax rate  :
 =
(r   n)[s(1  )  (1 + n)k]
1 + n+ s(r   n)  
1 + n
1 + r
 +
1 + n
1 + n+ s(r   n)g (42)
Thus, an increase in g raises  (but reduces b) while an increase in  reduces
 (but raises b): It follows that shifts in g or  produce a negative correlation
the steady-growth values of  and b. Other parameter shifts yield a positive
correlation; an increase in the wage share, for instance, will raise both b and 
if r > n:
3.3 Fluctuations in condence
The analysis can be extended to cover the e¤ects of uctuations in saving rates.
Assume that the saving rate uctuates across generations. These variations
could be the result of variations in the discount rate across generations, but
variations in condence or expected returns can do the trick too.14 Thus,
assume (in line with standard assumptions) that  > 1 and note that the saving
rate at period t depends on the young generations expected rate of return in the
14Deleveraging and asymmetries between debtors and creditors can also lead to changes in
saving rates in a more general setting (Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)). Our simple OLG
structure with saving by the young and dissaving by the old precludes these e¤ects.
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next period. Abandoning the assumption of perfect foresight and using ret+1 to
denote the rate of return in period t+1 that is expected by the young generation
in period t, we can re-write equations (37) as
~st =
st(wt    t) + (1  st) 1+n1+ret+1 t+1
wt    t (43)
where
st =
(1 + ret+1)
(1 )=
(1 + )1= + (1 + ret+1)
(1 )= (44)
From (43) and (44) it follows that ~st is decreasing in ret+1 when  > 1: A
pessimistic outlook leads to a high saving rate (and if the capital stock were to
increase as a result, the realized return would in fact be reduced, thus partially
vindicating the pessimistic expectations). Our primary concern in this paper,
however, is not the sources of uctuations in saving. To simplify the analysis, we
therefore consider the e¤ects of exogenous uctuations in the young generations
saving rate out of current disposable income (~st).
3.3.1 Distributionally neutral intervention
The e¤ects of uctuations in the saving rate on employment (in the Keynesian
setting) or dynamic e¢ ciency (in the non-Keynesian setting) can be o¤set by a
distributionally neutral policy intervention: institute a transfer to those young
generations that are unduly pessimistic (tend to consume too little) and nance
the transfer by taxing the same generation when it gets old. The transfer
increases the saving of the young generation as well as its consumption. But the
additional saving will be more than fully absorbed by the issue of government
bonds, thus leading to a decline in the amount of saving that has to be matched
by xed investment. Conversely, an overly optimistic generation can be taxed
in the rst period and compensated by a transfer in the second.
The aim is to achieve ut = u and kt = k = 1=(u) so as to maintain full
employment and avoid ine¢ ciency. Using these targets and substituting (39)
into (40), we get
 t =
(1 + n)k + g + (1 + r)bt   t   ~st(1  )
1  ~st (45)
The tax on the old generation (t) and the public debt (bt) appear on the right
hand side of equation (45), and these variables still need to be determined.
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Distributional neutrality means that a generation should not be favored (or
punished) because of its degree of condence. If b and  denote the steady-
growth values of b and  along the optimal path when there are no variations
in condence, this requirement can be stated formally as
(1 + r)(k + bt+1)  t+1 = (1 + r)(k + b)   (46)
The expression on the left hand side of equation (46) gives the income available
to an old generation in period t + 1. Neutrality requires that this income be
equal to the level that characterizes the steady growth path. The stabilization of
output and the consumption of the old generation at their steady-growth values
implies that the consumption of the young will also be at its steady-growth
value.
Using (45) and (46), the equation for the tax on the young at time t can
now be written
 t =
(1 + n)k + g + (1 + r)b      ~st(1  )
1  ~st (47)
Hence,
@ t
@~st
=   (1  )   t
1  ~st (48)
As long as the disposable income of the young is positive ((1   )    t > 0),
we have @t@~st < 0:
3.3.2 Tax expectations
The above analysis uses systematic variations in  t and t+1 to get distrib-
utional neutrality across generations. We have taken the saving rate ~s as
exogenous, however. This combination of assumptions may seem unreasonable
since in general the saving rate depends on the tax structure. The private sec-
tors anticipation of future taxes does not, however, negate the possibility of
distributionally neutral stabilization.
Taxes can be used as an insurance mechanism when future taxes are antici-
pated. Consider the extreme case where taxes are perfectly foreseen. Formally,
let t+1 be determined by
(1 + n)t+1 = (1 + n)
 + (1 + rt+1)(wt    t   c1;t) (49)
 =
rt+1   r
1 + rt+1
(50)
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The tax scheme in (49)-(50) combines lumpsum taxes () with a proportional
tax on capital income (): The proportional tax rate is conditional on the re-
alized rate of return, and the conditionality ensures that the private after-tax
rate of return always will be r: Thus, using (49)-(50), the household budget
constraint (34) can be rewritten
c2;t+1 = (wt    t   c1;t)(1 + rt+1)  (rt+1   r)(wt    t   c1;t)  (1 + n)
= (1 + r)(wt    t   c1;t)  (1 + n) (51)
The budget constraint becomes independent of condence. Consequently, the
tax rate on the young should be set at the steady-growth level,  t = ; and
no variations are required. What happens is that the conditional tax scheme
provides insurance and e¤ectively guarantees that the rate of return will be at
the steady-growth value.15
The assumptions underlying this example may be implausible. The tax
scheme may not be credibleand the perceived budget constraint could di¤er
from (51), even if policy makers were to follow (49)-(50). Or putting it dif-
ferently, a combination of condence e¤ects and perfect anticipation of future
taxes as in the above example may seem even more questionable than the
more common Ricardian assumptions of prefect foresight with respect to both
taxes and future returns. In response to this objection, one can take one of
two routes: assume that there are no variations in condence or, alternatively
accept that variations in condence do occur and that households do not fully
anticipate future taxation. The rst route we will leave to others; the second
can be approached by examining as in equation (46) how variations in the
saving rate can be neutralized by taxation.
3.3.3 Non-neutral intervention
The analysis may be subject to another objection. Sections 3.2.1-3.2.2 assume
that the private sector is subject to swings in condence but that the govern-
ment correctly anticipates the rate of return on capital and has the ability to
15 Intervention is also desirable in the case where the uctuations in consumption derive from
intergenerational di¤erences in discount rates. In this case, the tax regime does not serve as
an insurance scheme. Instead, the distortionary e¤ects of taxes on capital income can be
used to stabilize the capital stock and avoid dynamic ine¢ ciencies, even if private agents have
perfect foresight. It should be noted that intra-generational discount rates have no direct
bearing on the appropriate intergenerational discount rate and therefore cannot determine
the socially optimal trajectory for kt.
15
implement fairly sophisticated tax schemes. Intergenerational neutrality and
perfect government foresight are not required, however, for the stabilization of
kt at k.
Without foresight, policy makers may not be able to implement a neutral
insurance scheme but that does not preclude the stabilization of k at k. To
see this, consider the simple case in which capital income is taxed at a constant
(time-invariant) rate (),
t = (kt + bt)(1 + rt) (52)
Unlike in section 3.2.2,  need not satisfy (50) and  returning to the case
without private sector anticipation of future taxes we take the variations in
the youngs saving rate out of current disposable income (~st) to be exogenous.16
By assumption the prot share is constant (t = ) and the policy is designed
to keep kt = k (and thus rt = r):
Combining these assumptions and (52) with equations (39) and (40), the
debt dynamics can be written
bt+1 = At  Btbt (53)
where
At =
~st[(1  )  g + (1 + r)k]  k(1 + n)
(1 + n)(1  ~st) (54)
Bt = (1  )1 + r

1 + n
~st
1  ~st (55)
For a constant value of ~s and a su¢ ciently large tax rate , the di¤erence
equation (53) has a unique, stable stationary point,
b =
A
1 +B
(56)
Random uctuations in ~st generate uctuations in At and Bt (and thereby in
bt, also in the long run).17 But if the ratio At=(1 +Bt) is bounded then so are
16With the proportional tax on capital income the relation (36) between ~st and st implies
using (38) that
~st =
st
1  (1  st)
Hence, the argument could also be phrased in terms of exogenous movements in s:
17Other non-neutral schemes could be used, including one with a balanced government
budget at all times. Continuous full employment (kt = k) could be maintained without
16
the uctuations in bt:
4 Monetary policy and the choice of technique
As shown in section 2.1, a Leontief production function does not exclude market
clearing and dynamic e¢ ciency under perfect competition. Moreover, even if a
smooth production function may allow long-run changes in capital intensity, it
seems doubtful that variations in capital intensity can maintain full employment
in response to swings in condence, as exemplied by decreasing consumption
rates following the collapse of a housing bubble. Thus, the xed coe¢ cient
assumption which we used throughout section 3 can be defended on grounds of
realism and relevance as well as analytical simplicity.
The Leontief assumption can also be justied along lines that are consistent
with Lerners analysis of functional nance. Monetary policy, Lerner argued,
should be used to set interest rates at levels that induce an optimal amount of
investment. In a long-term context, this criterion translates into interest rates
that produce an optimal capital-output ratio. Thus, the xed coe¢ cients of the
Leontief production function can be seen as the outcome of a prot maximizing
choice of technique for a given cost of external nance (a given real rate of
interest) and a given (prot maximizing) markup on marginal cost (Skott 1989,
chapter 5).
Assume, for simplicity, that the smooth long-run production function is
Cobb-Douglas,
Yt = K

t L
1 
t (57)
Let Wt and Pt be the money wage rate and the price of capital goods, and let
i and  denote the cost of nance (the real rate of interest) and the rate of
depreciation. Cost minimization requires
min
Lt;Kt
WtLt + (i+ )PtKt (58)
s:t: (uKt)L1 t = Yt
where u is the expected average (= desired) utilization rate of the capital
stock.
government decits by taxing the pessimistic young and transferring the tax revenue to the
currently old generation.
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From the constraint in (58), Kt = Yt
1 

t =u
 where t = Yt=Lt, and substi-
tuting this expression into the objective function, the minimization programme
can be rephrased as
min
t
Wt
 1
t + (i+ )Pt
1
u

(1 )=
t (59)
The rst order condition yields
t =

u
i+ 

1  
Wt
Pt

(60)
The price of capital goods, Pt, may be exogenous to the individual rm
but in a one-good model this price must be equal to the general price level in
equilibrium. A simple mark-up rule (as in section 3) implies
Pt = (1 +m)Wt
1
t
(61)
Combining equations (60)-(61) we have
t =


1  

u
i+ 

1
1 +m
=(1 )
(62)
Thus, the choice of technique is fully determined by i, u and m: Cost min-
imization produces one relation between t and Wt=Pt; pricing decisions give
another relation. In equilibrium these two relations equations (60) and (61) 
must be mutually consistent. This consistency requirement xes the real wage
and the coe¢ cients of the Leontief production function.
Assuming, for simplicity, that rms raise nance by issuing (short) bonds,
the model now contains two nancial assets, and it is reasonable to add an-
other two, cash and equity. In advanced economies households typically do not
own physical capital directly; ownership takes the form of equity shares. Thus,
household portfolios consist of four nancial assets, money, equity and two types
of bonds. If we disregard risk, private agents will only want to hold non-interest
bearing cash for transactions purposes; abstracting from this transactions de-
mand cash holdings must be zero in equilibrium. absence of risk also implies
that equity and the two bonds become perfect substitutes. These three assets
must carry the same rate of return, and the household portfolio choice leaves the
composition of the portfolio undetermined. The rate of return is determined by
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monetary policy: the central bank determines the return on bonds through its
open market operations,18 and the equality between the bond rate and the rate
of return on equity is ensured via the valuation of shares. Appendix A provides
the details.
A particular zero-debt natural rate of interestcould be dened as the rate
which yields a choice of technique such that no public debt is required along
a full employment growth trajectory. In the Cobb-Douglas case, for instance,
the required capital-labor ratio is given by equation (15) . By denition kt =

1=
t =u
 and, using (62), the solution for i becomes
i = (u)

(1  )2
(2 + )(1 + n)
1 +m
   (63)
The zero-debt natural rate of interest may imply dynamic ine¢ ciency; in fact,
the rate may be negative. In the latter case, full-employment growth with
zero public debt will require a positive ination rate; the economy su¤ers from
a structural liquidity trap(Nakatani and Skott 2007, Skott 2001). Putting it
di¤erently, the interest rate that is consistent with full-employment growth the
natural rate of interest depends on scal policy and the debt ratio. Functional
nance can be interpreted as an attempt to (i) identify the optimal capital
intensity, (ii) set the interest rate at the associated level through an appropriate
monetary policy, and (iii) use scal policy to make the natural interest rate
equal to this optimally chosen rate.
5 Discussion
5.1 Public debt, interest rates and economic growth
An exogenous rise in debt will be associated with a fall in the capital stock
and an increase in the return on capital in standard OLG models. A functional
nance approach to scal policy makes this result irrelevant. Fiscal policy and
the level of debt adjust endogenously: debt is allowed to increase if an increase
is necessary to maintain both full employment and the optimal capital intensity.
18Since the private sector holds no cash when the interest rate is positive, the equilibrium
net position of the central bank must also be zero for any positive interest rate.
Bank loans to rms and household bank deposits could be used instead of or in addition
to corporate bonds. Assuming, for simplicity, that there are no costs in banking, that there
is free entry and banks make no prots, and that households hold money only in the form of
bank deposits, then total bank loans must equal total deposits and the same interest rate will
apply to deposits and loans.
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A perfectly executed scal policy of this kind would show uctuations in debt
(as in section 3.3) with a constant rate of interest.
Of course, scal policy may not always be conducted following the principles
of functional nance  the current obsession with austerity testies to that 
but the result carries important implications for empirical evaluation: observed
correlations between interest rates and debt depend on the interaction between
policy regimes and variations in private sector behavior. Without knowledge of
the sources of changes in the public debt, there is no way to predict the empirical
correlation between debt and interest rates. Thus, it is not surprising that the
results of empirical studies are weak and inconclusive.19
The potential OLG link between high debt, low levels of capital (and income)
and high interest rates represents a level, rather than a growth e¤ect of debt.
The transition to a new level involves temporary changes in the growth rate, and
the possibility of a debt - growth link has received great attention following the
publication of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010).20 The
theoretical story behind this link is a little unclear and theoretical ambiguities
accentuate the di¢ culty of interpreting empirical results.21
Accepting, for the sake of the argument, that a negative correlation can be
found between debt and economic growth, a key question concerns causation.
This question has two parts. The rst part asks whether actual past episodes
of rising debt did in fact cause a decline a growth (as opposed to a reverse
causal link between the two variables or an explanation in which a third factor
accounts for the changes in both debt and growth). This part of the question has
been addressed by Irons and Bivens (2010) who argue that empirically causation
has run from growth to debt. Their analysis considers short and medium term
e¤ects of a slowdown in growth on decits and debt. But as shown in section
3.2, functional nance may produce a long-run causal link between growth rates
19 In the words of Engen and Hubbard (2005, p.83), there is little empirical consensus about
the magnitude of the e¤ect ... some economists believe there is a signicant, large, positive
e¤ect of government debt on interest rates, others interpret the evidence as suggesting that
there is no e¤ect on interest rates. Bohn (2010, p.14) makes a similar statement about the
di¢ culty of nding signicant interest e¤ects of debt. He goes on to suggest that a leading
explanation is Ricardian neutrality. There is no need for Ricardian neutrality to explain the
results, however; our OLG model does not display neutrality.
20A debt - capital link would seem to imply a decit - growth link, however; not a debt -
growth nexus.
21Kumar and Woo mention a number of possible channels, including the e¤ect of higher
interest rates on capital accumulation, and the potential e¤ects of debt induced increases
in uncertainty about prospects and policies. As discussed above, the evidence on a debt
- interest rate link is tenuous, at best. The latter e¤ect seems to be a close cousin of what
Krugman has been referring to as the condence fairy, and it is hard to see how contractionary
scal policies will enhance condence in a recession.
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and debt: a reduction in the long-run rate of growth will tend to produce an
increase in the long-run debt ratio.
The second part of the question is more radical. One may ask whether it is
at all meaningful to look for a general answer to a reduced-form question about
the growth e¤ects of public debt. A particular example of this general prob-
lem is sometimes used to suggest the seriousness of the current debt problem.
According to Rogo¤ and Reinhart (2010, p. 6),
. . .war debts are arguably less problematic for future growth and
ination than large debts that are accumulated in peace time. Post-
war growth tends to be high as war-time allocation of man-power
and resources funnels to the civilian economy. Moreover, high war-
time government spending, typically the cause of the debt buildup,
comes to a natural close as peace returns. In contrast, a peacetime
debt explosion often reects unstable underlying political economy
dynamics that can persist for very long periods.
As pointed out by Michl (2011):
To a Keynesian, the quote above would very sensibly read high
recession-time government spending, typically the cause of the debt
buildup, comes to a natural close as growth returns.(In fact, Keynes
(1972, p. 144) once aptly described government borrowing as na-
tures remedy for preventing a recession from deteriorating into a
total collapse in production.) As for the rest of the quote, who
would deny that unstable political dynamics can be an obstacle
to growth?
The general point is simple. A scal expansion is intrinsically neither good
nor bad. Appropriate scal policy  and appropriate movements in debt 
depend on the economic circumstances. Reduced-form correlations whether in
a simple bivariate analysis or from growth regressions that include other controls
depend on the underlying sources of the movements in debt. A reckless scal
expansion can cause overheating, ination and macroeconomic instability. But
these e¤ects of bad policy say little about the growth e¤ects of scal expansion
in a deep recession.
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5.2 Public debt and intergenerational distribution
Claims that high public debt hurts future generations have gured prominently
in popular debates and also appear in the academic literature. Having found
that public debt has at most small e¤ects on interest rates, Engen and Hub-
bard (2005), go on to caution that public decits and debt still matter because
large levels of government debt can represent a large transfer of wealth to -
nance current generations consumption from future generations which much
eventually pay down federal debt to a sustainable level.(p. 132)
The possibility that scal policy can hurt future generations is not contro-
versial; inappropriate scal policy can have negative e¤ects for future as well as
for current generations. But our analysis of an OLG model without bequests 
the setting that is most favorable to the case for adverse future e¤ects of public
debt  shows that debt need not be a burden on future generations. On the
contrary, it can serve to remove dynamic ine¢ ciencies and maintain full employ-
ment. Moreover, uctuations in condencecan be addressed through policies
that are neutral in the e¤ects on the intergenerational distribution. Even when
a policy is not fully neutral in this sense, future generations may be better o¤
than without the policy. With a xed tax rate on capital income, for instance,
the required variations in the tax on the young generation will have distribu-
tional e¤ects: a pessimistic generation will be favored by a reduction in its taxes
(section 3.3.3). This result does not imply that future generations would be bet-
ter o¤without the reduction, however. In the absence of scal expansion, a lack
of demand would a¤ect utilization, reduce investment and the future capital
stock, and jeopardize employment.
5.3 Austerity and long term consolidation
Austerity programs often include reductions in entitlement programs like social
security or medicare. These reductions can clearly be distributionally regressive.
Surprisingly, perhaps, they may also aggravate the debt problem: the changes
correspond to a rise in the tax on the older generation, and as shown in sec-
tion 3.2, this increases the debt that is required to maintain dynamic e¢ ciency
and full employment. A reduction in government consumption (g), likewise,
requires an increase in the long-run debt. The general point, once again, is that
the desirable level of public debt depends on a range of behavioral and policy
variables.
These results suggest that from a functional nance perspective Krugmans
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powerful critiques of austerity may be insu¢ ciently radical. His insistence that
the slump is not the time to cut the debt is fully in line with functional nance22
but Krugman also suggests that the US has long run budget problems that must
be addressed once we are out of recession.23 The nature of the long run debt
problem is not made clear however. This is not to say that there can be no
adverse consequences of high public debt. But these consequences have to be
clearly specied and balanced against the benets.
6 Conclusion
Are the current debt levels and scal decits sustainable? It is not always clear
what is meant by sustainability, but the question may be whether the scal
requirements for full employment growth will generate an ever-increasing debt-
GDP ratio.24 The analysis in this paper says no. It suggests that scal policy
and public debt may be needed to avoid dynamic ine¢ ciency and maintain full
employment, and that this scal policy need not and in our OLG model do not
lead to any kind of unsustainability.25 We have shown, moreover, that this scal
policy need not produce adverse e¤ects on interest rates or economic growth.
Nor does it necessarily a¤ect the inter-generational distribution: uctuations in
household condencecan be addressed through distributionally neutral poli-
cies.
The model is abstract and has obvious limitations. Most prominently, per-
haps, we have assumed a closed economy. Open (and local) economies are in a
very di¤erent position than sovereign countries that control their own currency;
this paper says nothing about the open-economy issues.26 A second obvious
22Jayadev and Konczal (2010) and Guajardo et al. (2011) challenge the Alesina and
Ardagna (2010) claim of expansionary austerity.
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Yes, the United States has a long-run budget problem. Dealing with that
problem is going to require, rst of all, sharply bending the curve on Medicare
costs; without that, nothing works. And second, its going to require some
combination of spending cuts and revenue increases, amounting to at least
3 percent of GDP and probably more, on a permanent basis. (Krugman,
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/notes-on-rogo¤-wonkish/)
24A convergent debt-income ratio is closely related to the S2 indicator of sustainability;
see, e.g., Andersen (2012).
25As shown by Ryoo and Skott (2012), functional nance can produce unstable debt-income
dynamics in settings with intra-generational heterogeneity. These unstable scenarios are
closely linked to (intra-generational) distribution e¤ects and can be avoided by changes in
the structure of taxation.
26Chalk (2000, p. 319) argues that some OECD countries have seen an explosion in their
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limitation is the neglect of heterogeneity within generations and questions of
intra-generational distribution. Public debt may have regressive distributional
e¤ects if taxes on wage income are used to nance interest payments to the rich.
The incentive e¤ects of taxes, third, have been ignored throughout. A higher
level of debt need not be associated with higher tax rates but even if it is, the
scale of government consumption and the form of taxation may be more impor-
tant than the level of debt for the public sectors incentive e¤ects.27 Fourth,
the model only indirectly addresses inationary concerns. Engen and Hubbard
(2005) suggest that federal government debt may also pose the temptation to
monetize the debt, causing ination. They point out, however, that this con-
cern has not been a problem in the United States over the past fty years(p.
98); Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) also nd no evidence for a link between debt
and ination in advanced economies. The ination fear essentially boils down
to a concern that policy may not in the future be governed by a functional -
nance criterion: eliminate both unemployment and ination(Lerner 1943, p.
41). Fifth, the size of the public debt inuences the e¤ectiveness of monetary
policy. A contractionary monetary policy raises interest rates and generates
an automatic scal expansion unless it is matched by an increase in tax rates.
Thus, monetary policy is blunted when debt is high and this may complicate
short-run economic policy. The simple OLG structure, sixth, may be appealing
for an analysis of public debt, but it has peculiar properties that nd no support
in data. The model implies that the saving rate is inversely related to the prot
share: only the young save, and the young get their income as wage income.
Empirically, however, saving rates are higher out of prots than wages. Thus,
the saving assumptions that are at the center of the analysis in OLG models
can be questioned.28
Our analysis, nally, has taken as given the level of government spending.
Public investment in environmental areas, infrastructure, education and health
clearly contribute to future welfare, and many items of public consumptionand
social spending can have a high future payo¤ even in narrow economic terms
indebtedness to such an extent that the solvency of the public sector is brought into question.
Solvency questions of this kind may be relevant for countries with debt in foreign currency.
But it is unclear how a sovereign state could ever become insolvent if its debt obligations are
denominated in a currency that it can print at will.
27The importance of incentives for growth are disputed. Fast growth during the golden age
was associated with high marginal tax rates in the US, and the Nordic welfare states show
a very respectable performance, including low unemployment and labor force participation
rates that exceed those of the US.
28We abandon these assumptions in Ryoo and Skott (2012) which builds on the stock-ow
consistentframework from Skott (1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008).
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 from lower crime and higher future earnings. The benets and distributional
e¤ects of public spending could justiably be ignored in the debt discussion if
government investment (and other spending) were already at an agreed-upon
optimal level. A good deal of the debate over public debt, however, may reect
underlying controversies over the desirable level of public spending. These issues
are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Appendix A:
Using M and V to denote the amount of corporate bonds and the value of
corporate equity and assuming a constant price of output (normalized to one),
Tobins (average) q is given by
q =
M + V
K
(64)
Assume for simplicity that rms distribute all prots and nance investment
exclusively through corporate bonds. Thus,
Kt+1 =Mt+1 (65)
By assumption the rate of return on investment in corporate assets must be
equal to the interest rate i: Hence,29
(1 + i)(Mt+1 + Vt+1) = Yt+1   wt+1Lt+1 + (1  )Kt+1 + Vt+2 (66)
or
(1 + i)qt+1 = (1 + i)
Mt+1 + Vt+1
Kt+1
=
Yt+1   wt+1Lt+1 + (1  )Kt+1 + Vt+2
Kt+1
= (1 +R) +
Vt+2
Kt+1
= (1 +R) +
(Mt+2 + Vt+2) Mt+2
Kt+2
Kt+2
Kt+1
= 1 +R+ (qt+2   1)(1 + n) (67)
where R is the rate of return on capital and using (62) R = R(i):30 In steady
growth we have qt = q and (67) reduces to
(1 + i)q = 1 +R(i) + (q   1)(1 + n) (68)
or
q =
R(i)  n
i  n (69)
29Mt+1 and Vt+1 denote the debt and equity valuation at the beginning of period t+ 1.
30Using (62) and  = 
 1
 , we have
R = u    = u 1    =


1  

1  


(i+ )    R(i)
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We have R(i)  i and the rate of interest must exceed the growth rate to avoid
dynamic ine¢ ciency; with this restriction, equation (69) implies q  1 and
@q=@i < 0:
Household wealth takes the form of nancial assets, and the saving equation
(32) can be written
Bt+1 +Mt+1 + Vt+1 = St (70)
Dividing through by Lt and using (36), we get the following modied version of
(38)
(1 + n)(bt+1 + qt+1kt+1) = ~st(wt    t) (71)
Equation (40), with rt replaced by i, still holds and and the steady growth
solution for b becomes
b =
s(1  )(ku)   (1 + n)qk
1 + n+ s(i  n) +
1
1 + i
   s

1 + n+ s(i  n)g (72)
where s; k and q are determined by the interest rate i; s via equation (4),
k via the choice of technique and q via (69).
29
